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ATTORNEY PAPERS, HISTORY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY: A PROPOSED
AMENDMENT TO MODEL RULE 1.6
Patrick Shilling*
INTRODUCTION
On November 22, 1963, President John F. Kennedy was
assassinated in Dallas, Texas.1 That evening, the government arrested
Lee Harvey Oswald and charged him with the assassination.- Two
days later, on November 24, 1963, Jack Ruby shot and killed Oswald.'
Since that weekend, conspiracy theorists have speculated that Oswald
may have acted in concert with others.4 What if, during the two days
between his arrest and murder, Oswald had spoken with an attorney?
What if he had told that attorney what really happened? What if he
had told the attorney the name of the assassin and provided proof, but
told the attorney not to reveal this information because he feared
what could happen to his family?5
* J.D. Candidate, 2002, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Mary Daly for her helpful comments and suggestions and for planting the
seed for this Note. Thanks also to my parents and little brothers for their constant
love and support, and to my friends for being welcome distractions. Most
importantly, I would like to thank Kara Gerhart for too many things to list in one
footnote.
1. Hugh Trevor-Roper, Introduction to Mark Lane, Rush to Judgment 7, 7
(1966).
2. Mark Lane, Rush to Judgment 81 (1966).
3. Trevor-Roper, supra note 1, at 7.
4. See, e.g., David W. Belin, November 22, 1963: You Are the Jury 475 (1973)
(inviting readers to draw their own conclusions about whether Oswald killed
Kennedy); Lane, supra note 2, at 36 (stating that one would have to ignore the
accounts of several witnesses to believe that the only shots came from Oswald's
location); Leo Sauvage, The Oswald Affair: An Examination of the Contradictions
and Omissions of the Warren Report 273-81 (Charles Gaulkin trans., The World
Publishing Co. 1966) (1965) (offering three different conspiracy theories to explain
the Kennedy assassination).
5. This hypothetical is not unlike one used to begin a 1988 National Law Journal
article addressing the same issue as this Note. See David A. Kaplan, A Matter of Truth
or Confidences: Does Attorney-Client Privilege Outweigh Demands of History?, Nat'l
L.J., July 4, 1988, at 36. The hypothetical in that article described John Wilkes Booth
seeing an attorney after the assassination of Abraham Lincoln but before Booth's
death. Id.
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Under the current ethics rules, that attorney would not be able to
disclose the information that Oswald gave him, even after Oswald's
death.6 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules")
prohibit an attorney from disclosing information that clients
communicate in confidence,7 and this prohibition survives the death of
the client.8  Thus Oswald's hypothetical attorney, though she
possessed information of incredible historical import, would have to
take the information to her grave because of the duty of
confidentiality.' While attorney confidentiality rules have persuasive
justifications," such a result is unnecessary. An amendment to
existing attorney ethics rules, if carefully crafted, could allow historical
disclosure while still encouraging client candor.
This Note examines the relevant ethics rules pertaining to lawyers'
duty of confidentiality and proposes an exception to that duty.
Although currently the duty of confidentiality prohibits disclosure of
client confidences, the proposed amendment to the rule would allow
attorneys to donate their files that pertain to deceased clients to
historical repositories, as long as the potential benefit to history
outweighs the harm that may be done to the deceased client or his
family. The exception to the duty of confidentiality proposed by this
Note will benefit history by making significant information available
while limiting the chilling effect on attorney-client communication
that could accompany such a proposal. Part I discusses the historical
and legal sources and justifications for the duty of confidentiality.
Part II outlines the conflict that exists between the duty of
confidentiality and the potential value of attorneys disclosing
confidences that have historical significance. Part III argues that an
exception allowing disclosure, if carefully crafted, would not conflict
with the justifications for the current nondisclosure rules. This part
then details previous attempts to craft an exception for historical
disclosure, and demonstrates their shortcomings. Finally, Part III
proposes a new amendment to Model Rule 1.6 that would allow
attorneys to donate their files and at the same time protect deceased
clients' reputations and property interests.
6. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
7. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6(a) (1998) [hereinafter Model Rules].
8. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
9. See Jerold S. Auerbach, Lawyers' Papers as a Source of Legal History: The
20th Century, 69 Law Libr. J. 310, 310 (1976) ("The principle of lawyer-client
confidentiality has virtually removed from historians' scrutiny the inner workings of
the professional practice of any modem lawyer."). But see infra notes 131-39 and
accompanying text (discussing attorneys who have donated their files to historical
repositories despite the duty of confidentiality).
10. See infra Part I.C (discussing the justifications behind the duty of
confidentiality).
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I. BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE DUTY OF
CONFIDENTIALITY
Confidentiality of client information is a "cornerstone of the
attorney-client relationship"" and is deeply ingrained "in the
traditional notion of the Anglo-American client-lawyer
relationship.' 2 The duty of confidentiality stems from two separate
but related bodies of law: the ethical rules that require confidentiality
and the attorney-client privilege. 3 The ethical rules require an
attorney to hold client confidences inviolate in and out of court. 4 The
attorney-client privilege, on the other hand, is an evidentiary privilege
that addresses when an attorney may be compelled to testify about
communications with a client. 5 Therefore, although the two doctrines
are based on similar justifications, 6 they differ in scope. 7 This Note
primarily addresses issues pertaining to the duty of confidentiality; the
attorney-client privilege is discussed only as it relates to the ethical
duty.18 This part examines the sources of the ethical duty to hold
clients' confidences inviolate, as well as the justifications for this duty.
11. Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn Clients About Limits on
Confidentiality, 39 Cath. U. L. Rev. 441,443 (1990).
12. Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 6.1.1, at 242 (1986).
13. Model Rules, supra note 7, R. 1.6 cmt. 5. Some commentators argue that the
two sets of rules covering confidentiality should be unified into one body of law. See
Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent
Harm, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 1091, 1159 (1985) ("The coexistence of two disparate sets of
confidentiality rules has resulted in incoherent and unprincipled standards governing
disclosure of client misconduct. In order to rationalize the law, one standard must be
adopted.").
14. 24 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and
Procedure: Evidence § 5472, at 90 (1986).
15. The most commonly cited description of the attorney-client privilege is:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor,
(8) except the protection be waived.
8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2292, at 554 (John T.
McNaughton rev. ed., 1961).
16. Compare, Wolfram, supra note 12, § 6.13, at 243 (stating that the attorney-
client privilege rests upon, inter alia, the idea that lawyers must be able to ensure
confidentiality "to obtain client disclosure"), with Model Rules, supra note 7, R. 1.6
cmt. 4 (indicating that the obligation of confidentiality encourages clients "to
communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer").
17. 24 Wright & Graham, Jr., supra note 14, § 5472, at 90. Furthermore, the two
doctrines "are administered in a different spirit; ethics committees tend toward
expansive notions of confidentiality, while courts, in similar situations, lean toward
narrower constructions of the privilege." Id. For a discussion of the conflicting views
of the State and the bar on the law governing lawyers, see Susan P. Koniak, The Law
Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1389 (1992).
18. In general, the ethical duty of confidentiality sweeps more broadly and covers
more information than the attorney-client privilege. See Brian R. Hood, Note, The
Attorney-Client Privilege and a Revised Rule 1.6: Permitting Limited Disclosure After
the Death of the Client, 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 741,745-46 (1994).
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A. Agency Law
An attorney's duty not to disclose client confidences derives from
agency law,19 which governs lawyers because attorneys act as their
clients' agents.2° According to the Second Restatement of Agency, an
agent owes "a duty to the principal not to use or to communicate
information confidentially given him by the principal or acquired by
him during the course of or on account of his agency or in violation of
his duties as agent."'2 This prohibition applies even after the end of
the agency relationship.22 Similar to the attorney ethics rules,23 agency
law provides certain exceptions to the duty of confidentiality.24 The
scope of the exceptions in agency law, however, conflicts with the
prevailing view in ethics codes about the scope of confidentiality. 5
B. American Bar Association Ethics Codes
Although the duty of confidentiality has its origins in agency law,26
it has recently been dominated by attorney ethics codes. For most of
the twentieth century, a separate code of professional conduct has
governed lawyers. 27 The American Bar Association 28 ("ABA") has
been the primary source of the rules defining the lawyer's duty of
confidentiality. 29 The ABA's ethics codes evolved from a quick
19. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., The Law and Ethics of Lawyering 203 (3d ed.
1999); see also Wolfram, supra note 12, § 6.7.3, at 300 ("It is simply false professional
posturing to pretend that self-regulation alone has resulted in lawyers assuming
obligations of confidentiality toward their clients that external law does not already
largely impose.").
20. See Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 351, 361
(1989) ("At the heart of attorney-client confidentiality rules is the notion that lawyers
are clients' agents .... ).
21. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 395 (1958).
22. Id. § 396.
23. See infra notes 37, 55-58, 73-75 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Agency § 395 (allowing disclosure if "the
information is a matter of general knowledge").
25. See Hazard, Jr. et al., supra note 19, at 203; see also Zacharias, supra note 20,
at 362 ("[Sjtrict confidentiality rules forbid attorneys to disclose in a variety of
situations in which other agents might have free rein to follow their consciences.").
For example, agency law allows disclosure of information that is "general
knowledge." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 395. The Model Rules contain no
such exception. See Model Rules, supra note 7, R. 1.6 (b) (listing exceptions to
confidentiality rule, none of which involve allowing disclosure if the information is
generally known).
26. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
27. Wolfram, supra note 12, § 2.6.1, at 48.
28. The purpose of the ABA, founded in 1878, see id. § 2.6.2, at 53, was for "'the
advancement of the science of jurisprudence, the promotion of the administration of
justice and a uniformity of legislation throughout the country."' ABA, Division of
Media Relations and Public Affairs, ABA History, at http://www.abanet.org/
media/overview/phistory.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2001) (quoting the original ABA
Constitution).
29. Hood, supra note 18, at 750. At its inception, the ABA was not concerned
with devising standards of attorney conduct. See Wolfram, supra note 12, § 2.6.2, at
2744 [Vol. 69
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reference to the duty of confidentiality to substantial involvement
with confidentiality regarding client information.' A brief history of
the evolution of the duty of confidentiality in ABA codes follows.
1. The Canons of Professional Ethics
In 1908, the ABA adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics
("Canons").3' While the ABA did not originally intend the Canons
"to serve as a regulatory blueprint for enforcement through
disbarment and suspension actions,"" it nevertheless anticipated that
the Canons would play a significant role in the discipline of
attorneys.33
The Canons, as amended in 1928, are comprised of a Preamble and
forty-seven Canons. Canon 37, added in 1928, addresses the duty of
confidentiality," and states that an attorney must "preserve his client's
confidences ' 35  and that "[tlhis duty outlasts the lawyer's
employment. '36 At the same time, Canon 37 provides an exception to
the prohibition against disclosure in two instances: (1) if an attorney
is sued by his client; or (2) if a client intends to commit a crime." In
time, legal commentators argued that the Canons were "outdated and
vague. '38 In response to these complaints, the ABA replaced them
with the Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model
Code").39
53. Since 1928, however, it has been substantially involved in crafting attorneys' duty
of confidentiality. See infra Part I.B.1-3.
30. Wolfram, supra note 12, § 6.7.2, at 297.
31. Canons of Prof'l Ethics (1928) [hereinafter ABA Canons].
32. Wolfram, supra note 12, § 2.6.2, at 54.
33. See id at 55.
34. The Canons as promulgated in 1908 made only a passing reference to the duty
of confidentiality. Canon 6 states that a lawyer's "obligation to represent the client
with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the
subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely
affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been
reposed." ABA Canons, supra note 31, Canon 6. The ABA did not squarely address
attorney-client confidentiality until the 1928 amendments.
35. Id Canon 37. The Canons, however, do not define confidences. See Wolfram,
supra note 12, § 6.7.2, at 297.
36. ABA Canons, supra note 31, Canon 37.
37. Id Canon 41 seems to provide another exception to the duty of
confidentiality. It states that when an attorney learns that his client has perpetrated a
fraud on the court or a party, he should attempt to "rectify it; at first by advising his
client, and if his client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained, he should
promptly inform the injured person or his counsel." Id. Canon 41.
38. Wolfram, supra note 12, § 2.6.3, at 56.
39. Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility (1981) [hereinafter Model Code].
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2. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility
In 1969, the ABA adopted the Model Code,40 which consists of
three types of provisions: Canons, l Ethical Considerations4 and
Disciplinary Rules.43 The Canons in the Model Code are defined as
"axiomatic norms,"'  and are "general concepts from which the
Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations derive. 45
The Ethical Considerations are "aspirational in character and
represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession
should strive, 46 and as such, are "recommended but not required. 47
The Disciplinary Rules, however, are "mandatory in character"4 and
directly govern attorney conduct.49 They provide the floor for lawyer
conduct, below which an attorney is subject to a disciplinary
sanction.5
According to Canon 4 of the Model Code, a "lawyer should
preserve the confidences and secrets of a client."51 The Disciplinary
Rules associated with Canon 4 prohibit an attorney from "knowingly
reveal[ing] a confidence or secret of his client. '52 The Model Code
defines confidence as "information protected by the attorney-client
privilege under applicable law,"53 and a secret as "other information
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be
held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or
would be likely to be detrimental to the client."'  The Model Code,
however, contains several exceptions to the prohibition on disclosure.
A lawyer may reveal that which is normally prohibited if the client
40. The Model Code does not have the force of law until adopted by a
jurisdiction. See Wolfram, supra note 12, § 2.6.2, at 56. By the mid-1970s, almost
every state had adopted some form of the Model Code. Id.
41. For an example, see Model Code, supra note 39, Canon 6 ("A lawyer should
represent a client competently.").
42. For an example, see id. EC 6-5 ("A lawyer should have pride in his
professional endeavors. His obligation to act competently calls for higher motivation
than that arising from fear of civil liability or disciplinary penalty.").
43. For an example, see id. DR 6-102(A) ("A lawyer shall not attempt to
exonerate himself from or limit his liability to his client for his personal
malpractice.").
44. Id. Preliminary Statement.
45. Wolfram, supra note 12, § 2.6.3, at 58.
46. Model Code, supra note 39, Preliminary Statement.
47. Wolfram, supra note 12, § 2.6.3, at 59 (citation omitted).
48. Model Code, supra note 39, Preliminary Statement.
49. Wolfram, supra note 12, § 2.6.3, at 59.
50. Model Code, supra note 39, Preliminary Statement. Each state administers its
own disciplinary process. See, e.g., N.Y. Judiciary Law § 90(2) (McKinney 1983)
(authorizing the four Appellate Divisions in New York to punish attorneys for ethical
violations).
51. Model Code, supra note 39, Canon 4.
52. Id. DR 4-101(B)(1).
53. Id. DR 4-101(A).
54. Id.
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consents,55 if a court orders disclosure,-6 if the client intends to commit
a crime and "the information [is] necessary to prevent the crime," or
if the disclosure is necessary for the attorney to collect a fee or to
defend herself against claims of wrongful conduct.-8
3. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
As with the Canons,59 complaints quickly arose from the legal
community about the Model Code.' As a result, in 1977, the ABA
appointed a committee to redraft the Model Code.," The committee's
work led to the adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
in 1983.62
55. Id. DR 4-101(C)(1).
56. Id DR 4-101(C)(2).
57. Id. DR4-101(C)(3).
58. Id. DR 4-101(C)(4).
59. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
60. See Wolfram, supra note 12, § 2.6.4, at 60. Critics argued that the Model Code
could be "clearer and more responsive to modem practice realities." Id. Additionally,
some felt that the Model Code does not adequately address issues concerning
attorneys in nonlitigation practices, and does not give adequate guidance to solo
practitioners in "economically marginal practices." Id. For critiques of the Model
Code, see Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in
America 288 (1976) (indicating that the Model Code "restrict[s] access to legal
services to a privileged clientele and monopolize[s] legal business for the established
bar"); Jethro K. Lieberman, Crisis at the Bar: Lawyers' Unethical Ethics and What to
Do About It 65 (1978) (stating that the Model Code assumes the bar is
"homogeneous" when it is not); Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of
Professional Responsibility, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 702, 706 (1977) (stating that the Model
Code places the interests of the attorney over the interests of the client or the public);
Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 La. L Rev. 577, 578
(1975) (indicating that the Model Code does not contain any provisions dealing
specifically with the lawyer as a negotiator); Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism
and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 669, 672 (1978) (criticizing the Model
Code for focusing mainly on the lawyer as a litigator and largely ignoring an
attorney's role as a nonadvocate); John F. Sutton, Jr., How Vulnerable Is the Code of
Professional Responsibility?, 57 N.C. L. Rev. 497, 514 (1979) (reporting that many
provisions in the Model Code "all too often create a false sense of simplicity by
ignoring complicating factors"); Note, Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 79 Yale L.J.
1179, 1183 (1970) ("[T]he approach embodied in the [Model) Code has slight chance
either of lessening the incidence of 'unethical' conduct or of improving the quantity of
legal services available to the poor and the middle class.").
61. Wolfram, supra note 12, § 2.6.4, at 60-61. The committee was named the
Kutak Commission after its chair, Robert Kutak. Id. § 2.6.4, at 61 & n.72.
62. Much controversy and debate arose during the adoption of the Model Rules,
particularly concerning "proposals to expand and contract disclosure obligations."
Mary C. Daly, To Betray Once? To Betray Twice?: Reflections on Confidentiality, a
Guilty Client an Innocent Condemned Man, and an Ethics-Seeking Defense Counsel,
29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1611, 1620 (1996); see also Hood, supra note 18, at 753
(indicating that Rule 1.6's "expanded protection of client confidences was by a wide
margin the most controversial rule during the drafting and ultimate adoption of the
Model Rules").
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The Model Rules consist of a preamble, a statement of scope, a
section defining several relevant terms,63 and fifty-two rules.'
Explanatory comments follow each Rule65 to illustrate what the Rule
means and to explain the purposes behind it, but only "the text of
each Rule is authoritative."'  An attorney who does not comply with
the rules is subject to the state disciplinary process.67
Model Rule 1.6 addresses the duty of confidentiality." It does not
distinguish between confidences and secrets,69 but states that an
attorney may not "reveal information relating to representation of a
client."7 This prohibition applies to all information that is related to
the representation and is not limited to matters communicated by the
client.71 Yet, similar to the Model Code,' the Model Rules articulate
limited exceptions to the duty of confidentiality. An attorney may
reveal client information in three circumstances: (1) if a client
consents;73 (2) if it is necessary to prevent the client from committing a
crime that "the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm;"74 or (3) if the disclosure is necessary "to
63. For an example, see Model Rules, supra note 7, Terminology ("'Reasonable'
or 'Reasonably' when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a
reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.").
64. For an example, see id. R. 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
65. For an example, see id. R. 1.1 cmt. 6 ("To maintain the requisite knowledge
and skill, a lawyer should engage in continuing study and education. If a system of
peer review has been established, the lawyer should consider making use of it in
appropriate circumstances.").
66. Id. Scope.
67. Id. Like the Model Code, the Model Rules do not have the force of law until
they are adopted by a jurisdiction. See supra note 40. As of January 2001, forty-three
states have adopted the Model Rules. See 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William
Hodes, The Law of Lawyering app. B at B-3 to B-4 (3d ed. 2001). Many of these
states, however, made various changes to Model Rule 1.6 in the adoption process. See
Harris Weinstein, Client Confidences and the Rules of Professional Responsibility:
Too Little Consensus and Too Much Confusion, 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 727,733-36 (1994).
68. Model Rules, supra note 7, R. 1.6.
69. The Model Code, however, did distinguish between confidences and secrets.
See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
70. Model Rules, supra note 7, R. 1.6(a). Unlike the Model Code, the Model
Rules do not limit the duty of confidentiality to situations in which disclosure would
be embarrassing or detrimental to the client. See supra note 54 and accompanying
text. Instead, the Model Rules prohibit disclosure regardless of whether the
information "would embarrass or work to the detriment of a client." Wolfram, supra
note 12, § 6.7.2, at 298.
71. Model Rules, supra note 7, R. 1.6 cmt. 5. The Model Code, in contrast, only
protects information gained "in the professional relationship." Model Code, supra
note 39, DR 4-101 (A).
72. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
73. Model Rules, supra note 7, R. 1.6(a). This exception includes disclosures that
are not expressly authorized but are necessary "to carry out the representation." Id.
74. Id. R. 1.6(b)(1). This exception is more limited than its counterpart in the
Model Code, which allowed disclosure for future crimes without the imminent death
2748 [Vol. 69
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establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer."75 Otherwise, the
attorney must adhere to the duty of confidentiality.
C. Justifications for the Duty of Confidentiality
Several justifications underlie the professional requirement of
confidentiality.76 Most prominently, the promise of confidentiality
encourages clients to "communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer
even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter."'  This
frank communication allows the attorney to develop fully the "facts
essential to proper representation of the client.""7x Absent the promise
or substantial bodily harm requirement. See Model Code, supra note 39, DR 4-
101(C)(3); supra note 57 and accompanying text, see also Wolfram, supra note 12, §
6.7.2, at 298 (stating that the Model Rules provide "a more limited exception for
future client wrongdoing"). Some scholars have criticized this expansion of the duty
of confidentiality. For example, one commentator has postulated that attorneys have
limited discretionary disclosure in situations involving client misconduct "to avoid
being sued." Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. Chi. L Rev. 1. 12
(1998).
75. Model Rules, supra note 7, R. 1.6(b)(2). Some commentators have criticized
the fact that the Model Rules, and the Model Code before it, see Model Code, supra
note 39, DR 4-101 (C)(4), allow an attorney to disclose information to collect a fee or
to defend herself, but do not allow the same lawyer to disclose confidences to protect
or defend an innocent third party. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 74, at 10 ("The
lawyer's interest in collecting a fee is apparently a higher priority than exonerating an
innocent defendant about to be convicted of a capital crime .... Confidentiality
means everything in legal ethics unless lawyers lose money, in which case it means
nothing."); Hood, supra note 18, at 758-59 (characterizing Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) as a
"moral double standardi]" and "mean-spirited and selfish"). A response to this
argument is that
lawyers may be deterred from taking cases and rendered excessively
cautious in legal proceedings when they fear nonpayment or malpractice
charges. Other plausible responses are that it is unfair and expects too much
to require lawyers not to defend themselves from clients who are swindling
or accusing them, or that by refusing to pay or accusing the lawyer the client
is violating an implicit contract so that the lawyer's duty of confidentiality is
voided.
Bruce M. Landesman, Confidentiality and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, in The
Good Lawyer: Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers' Ethics 191, 193 (David Luban ed., 1983)
(citation omitted). While not stated expressly in Canon 37, the Canons were
interpreted to allow disclosure of client confidences in order to collect a fee. See ABA
Comm. on Prof'I Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 250 (1943).
76. For a discussion of the justifications of the confidentiality requirement in
philosophical terms, see Pizzimenti, supra note 11, at 444-47.
77. Model Rules, supra note 7, 1.6 cmt. 4; see also Model Code, supra note 39, EC
4-1 ("A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawy'er...
78. Model Rules, supra note 7, 1.6 cmt. 2; see also Model Code, supra note 39, EC
4-1 ("A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in
order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system."); People v. Beige,
372 N.Y.S.2d 798, 801 (Onondaga County Ct. 1975), affd, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (App.
Div. 1975), aff'd, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976) ("The effectiveness of counsel is only as
great as the confidentiality of its client-attorney relationship. If the lawyer cannot get
all the facts about the case, he can only give his client half of a defense."). One
commentator placed this argument into a three-step syllogism:
First, for the adversary system to operate, citizens must use lawyers to
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of confidentiality, clients may not disclose all of the relevant facts
needed for complete representation.79
Additionally, some argue that protecting client confidences
encourages obedience to the law. Because the duty of confidentiality
"encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance,"8 laypersons who
consult with an attorney before they act are advised about what the
law is. Many clients follow the advice given by their attorneys and, as
a result, the law is followed.81
Client autonomy provides another justification for the duty of
confidentiality. This argument begins with the observation that a
growing imbalance exists in the amount of power individuals possess
in relation to both the government and private enterprises.81
Increasingly, the State is regulating many relationships, both
commercial and personal.83  As a result, "the substantive and
procedural complexity of the law" makes the process of autonomous
decision-making nearly impossible for individuals who do not have a
firm grasp of the law.' A general right to privacy relates to this idea.'-
resolve disputes and the lawyers must be able to represent clients effectively.
Second, attorneys can be effective only if they have all the relevant facts at
their disposal. Third, clients will not employ lawyers, or at least will not
provide them with adequate information, unless all aspects of the attorney-
client relationship remain secret. Thus ... attorney-client confidentiality is
the foundation of orderly and effective adversarial justice.
Zacharias, supra note 20, at 358 (citations omitted). More simply stated, "[T]he secret
man heareth many confessions; for who will open himself to a blab or a babbler?"
Sarah Helene Sharp, On Being a Blab or a Babbler: The Ethics and Propriety of
Divulging Client Confidences, 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 79, 79 (1997) (citing Francis
Bacon, Of Simulation and Dissimulation, in Essays and New Atlantis 22 (Walter J.
Black ed., 1942)).
79. See Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960) (stating that proper
assistance from an attorney "can be made safely and readily available only when the
client is free from the consequences of apprehension of disclosure by reason of the
subsequent statements of the skilled lawyer"); N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n. Comm. on Prof'l
Ethics, Op. 479 (1978) ("If the client [suspects] that his confidences will not be
adequately protected ... ,he will be far more likely to withhold information which he
believes may be to his detriment or which he does not want generally known.").
80. Model Code, supra note 39, EC 4-1; see also Model Rules, supra note 7, R. 1.6
cmt. 2 (stating that the duty of confidentiality "encourages people to seek early legal
assistance").
81. Model Rules, supra note 7, R. 1.6 cmt. 3 ("Lawyers know that almost all
clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld."); see also Deborah L. Rhode,
Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 665, 673 (1994) ("By encouraging
individuals to seek legal advice and to disclose relevant information, the attorney-
client privilege and related ethical rules facilitate compliance with legal norms and
appropriate resolution of legal disputes."). This voluntary compliance with the law is
"particularly important to a free society which neither has nor should want sufficient
law enforcement resources to search out and punish every violation of every law." In
re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Tatel, J., dissenting), rev'd sub
nom. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
82. Daly, supra note 62, at 1623.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1623-24.
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The client's right to control private information about himself "is a
privacy right that is inherent to human dignity and to the development
of trust."'86 A client's innermost thoughts should not be disclosed just
because the client is compelled to give his attorney the information
"to ensure the autonomy to which [he is] entitled."'  Thus,
confidentiality is necessary to preserve autonomy in the complex
modern state.88
The duty of confidentiality, derived from agency law and codified in
the Model Rules, has important and significant justifications? It
poses, however, severe obstacles when information is sought for the
purpose of documenting history. The next part describes the conflict
between the requirement that attorneys hold client confidences
inviolate and the demands of history.
II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND
THE DEMANDS OF HISTORY
The duty of confidentiality does not include an exception for
historical disclosure after the death of the client." Thus, an attorney
could not ethically donate his files relating to a deceased client to an
historical repository, even after his own death? An exception to the
duty of confidentiality allowing historical disclosure would supply
historians with the information necessary to tell the story of the
country's past.92  Such an exception, however, may chill client
communication 93 and does not comport with the notion that attorneys
act as their client's fiduciaries. 4
85. See Pizzimenti, supra note 11, at 446.
86. Sharp, supra note 78, at 81.
87. Pizzimenti, supra note 11, at 446.
88. Daly, supra note 62, at 1624.
89. See supra Part I.C.
90. See Model Rules, supra note 7, R. 1.6(b) (listing exceptions to confidentiality
rule, none of which involve disclosure for historical benefit); see also Miss. St. Bar,
Op. 123 (1986) (the duty of confidentiality is owed to a deceased client); Miss. St. Bar,
Op. 119 (1986) (same); Wash. St. Bar Code of Prof'i Responsibility Comm'n, Formal
Op. 175 (1982) (same); Va. St. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 812 (1986) (stating that the
passage of time does not affect the duty of confidentiality). Apparently, such an
exception was never even considered. See Kaplan, supra note 5 (quoting Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., the "principal draftsman" for the Model Rules, as saying -[the notion of
an historical exception never was mentioned when we were writing the rules"). The
Model Code also contains no such exception. See Model Code, supra note 39, DR 4-
101(C) (listing exceptions to confidentiality rule, none of which involve disclosure for
historical benefit).
91. Legal Ethics Comm. of the D.C. Bar, Op. 128 (1983) (stating that an attorney
cannot donate his files to a university absent client consent if the files contain client
confidences); Okla. Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Legal Ethics Op. 301 (1983)
(stating that the files of an attorney, whether he is dead or alive, cannot be donated to
an historical institution even if they contain historically significant information).
92. See infra Part II.B.1.
93. See infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, such a rule may not be necessary since many attorneys
are already donating their files to historical repositories. 5 This part
addresses the tension between Model Rule 1.6 and the potential value
of information that attorneys possess.
A. The Case Against Historical Disclosure
Although a minimal amount of legal scholarship has been written
either advocating or condemning a possible historical exception to the
duty of confidentiality,96 the probable arguments advanced against
such a proposal are not difficult to predict. The primary argument
against allowing attorneys to make their files available to historians
lies in the justifications put forth for the existence of the
confidentiality requirement. 7 If clients know that their attorneys will
be able to make their files available to researchers in the future, they
will be reluctant to be candid.9" Thus, the danger is not to deceased
clients but to current and future clients who may not be as frank with
their attorneys if they know their communications may someday be
revealed.99 The knowledge that their secrets will remain confidential
after their death "encourages... client[s] to communicate fully and
frankly with counsel.""°
95. See infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
96. The National Law Journal addressed the issue in an article, see Kaplan, supra
note 5, and an editorial. See History vs. Ethics, Nat'l L.J., July 4, 1988, at 12. A few
years later, a student Note advocated an exception for historical disclosure. See
Bonnie Hobbs, Note, Lawyers' Papers: Confidentiality Versus the Claims of History,
49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 179 (1992); see also infra notes 267-76 and accompanying text
(discussing the rule proposed by Hobbs). Other students have addressed the more
specific issue of disclosure by prosecutors. See Rita M. Glavin, Note, Prosecutors Who
Disclose Prosecutorial Information for Literary or Media Purposes: What about the
Duty of Confidentiality?, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1809 (1995); Rachel Luna, Note, The
Ethics of Kiss-and-Tell Prosecution: Prosecutors and Post-Trial Publications, 26 Am J.
Crim. L. 165 (1998); see also infra note 266 (discussing these two Notes). A 1998
article discussed post-representation disclosure in general. See Hannibal B. Johnson,
The Propriety of Post-Representation Public Communication Defining the Contours of
Lawyer-Client Confidentiality in the Information Age, 22 J. Legal Prof. 85 (1998); see
also infra notes 277-85 and accompanying text (discussing Johnson's proposal).
97. See supra Part I.C.
98. See History vs. Ethics, supra note 96 ("[I]f public perception is that
[confidentiality] is merely one interest to be balanced against many others, individuals
may be less candid with counsel."). A somewhat analogous argument partially
justifies the secrecy that shrouds grand jury proceedings. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2)
(mandating secrecy for those involved in grand jury proceedings). One reason often
put forth in support of this rule is that it encourages grand jury witnesses to come
forward and testify "fully and frankly, without fear of retribution." In re Craig, 942 F.
Supp. 881, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). For other commonly asserted justifications of Rule
6(e)(2). see In re Am. Historical Ass'n, 49 F. Supp. 2d 274, 282-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
For a discussion of a judicially crafted exception to Rule 6(e)(2) for historical
purposes, see infra notes 164-75 and accompanying text.
99. Kaplan, supra note 5.
100. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 407 (1998). One court stated
it this way:
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If the historical disclosure exception is limited to posthumous
disclosure, clients may fear disclosure less, but this limitation is not
likely to allay their fears completely.' Clients may still be concerned
about their reputation," potential harm to friends and family,' 3 or
exposure of their estate to civil liability."" Disclosure only of
information that is not detrimental to the client's reputation and has
significant historical value may still chill client candor. "Even a
limited disclosure of relatively innocuous information" could end the
client's confidence in the attorney's ability to keep the client's secrets
inviolate. 5
The rationale behind [the duty of confidentiality] is as sound as it is
elementary. The confidences communicated by a client to his attorney must
remain inviolate for all time if the public is to have reverence for the law and
confidence in its guardians. It is traditional in the legal profession that the
fidelity of a lawyer to his client can be depended upon. The client must be
secure in his belief that the lawyer will be forever barred from disclosing
confidences reposed in him. It follows that if, in order to protect his secret
utterances to counsel, the client or former client is required to reveal these
utterances, the very purpose of the rule of secrecy vill be destroyed, and the
free flow of information from client to attorney, so vital to our system of
justice, will be irreparably damaged.
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345,355 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
101. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 407; see also li re John Doe Grand Jury
Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69, 71 (Mass. 1990) (stating that a rule that would allow an
attorney to disclose client confidences, "even though such disclosure might be limited
to the period after the client's death, would in many instances.... so deter the client
from 'telling all' as to seriously impair the attorney's ability to function effectively");
Simon J. Frankel, The Attorney-Client Privilege After the Death ofthe Client, 6 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 45, 60 (1992) ("Certainly some, indeed many, clients would actually be
more reluctant to confide fully in an attorney if they knew that their death would
leave their communications unprivileged.").
102. A great deal of evidence suggests that people are indeed concerned with their
reputation after their death. See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(Tatel, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nora. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399
(1998) ("From Andrew Carnegie's libraries to Henry Ford's foundation, one need
only count the schools and universities, academic chairs and scholarships, charitable
foundations, research institutes, and sports arenas... bearing the names of their
founders, benefactors, or authors to understand that human beings care deeply about
how posterity will view them."). One author has argued that people's concern with
their reputation even after their death is good for society because if they did not care
about their reputation, "they would likely behave worse-morally and legally-while
alive." Frankel, supra note 101, at 63.
103. See 2 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 199,
at 380 (1994) ("Clearly a client is concerned not only about himself but about his
larger human situation that includes spouses, parents, children, siblings, and extended
family, friends, and business associates."). Evidence that people are concerned about
the friends and family they leave behind after their death can be found in the fact that
people write wills, purchase life insurance, invest money for their children's education
and have guardianship arrangements in place. hr re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 240
(Tatel, J., dissenting).
104. Sividler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 407.
105. See Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82
Colum. L. Rev. 1426, 1434 (1982).
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Given the competing interests of history and confidentiality, some
scholars have asserted that the need to record history does not
outweigh the need for client confidentiality. For example, Professor
Monroe Freedman has argued that compared to the duty of
confidentiality, "'[t]he demands of history are not that important."' ' 16
In light of the fact that the information exists only because of the
attorney-client relationship, he "scoffs at the notion of historians'
rights."10 7 Freedman concludes, "'So what if we don't find out that so-
and-so had co-conspirators?" ' " In a recent case in which the
Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege survived the
client's death,a"9 the Court made a similar point. In response to the
argument that posthumous application of the privilege causes valuable
evidence to be unavailable, the Court indicated that absent an
assurance that the attorney-client privilege will extend past the client's
death, "the client may very well not have made disclosures to his
attorney at all, so the loss of evidence is more apparent than real." ' °
Another possible objection to any proposed exception to Model
Rule 1.6 for historical purposes is based on the "unique position of
trust and confidence" between an attorney and client,' which is a
result of their fiduciary relationship." 2  When a lawyer discloses
information about a former client, she "undermines the fiduciary duty
owed to that client.""' 3 Because the information that the attorney
discloses is to be used only in the representation of the client,' 4 critics
are likely to claim that a proposal to allow historical disclosure offends
the notion of lawyer as fiduciary." 5
106. Kaplan, supra note 5.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
110. Id. at 408.
111. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1994);
see also In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (N.Y. 1994) (stating that the
attorney is in a situation that requires the "ultimate trust").
112. See, e.g., Lakoff v. Lionel Corp., 137 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (Sup. Ct. 1955)
(recognizing "the grave fiduciary relationship between attorney and client"); see also
Sharp, supra note 78, at 80 ("The obligation to maintain client confidences arises from
the attorney's role as fiduciary.").
113. Mark E. O'Neill, Note, Curtailing Post-Representation Extrajudicial Speech, 47
Drake L. Rev. 379, 394 (1999). As one court wrote many years ago:
Now, it is the glory of our profession that its fidelity to its client can be
depended on; that a man may safely go to a lawyer and converse with him
upon his rights or supposed rights in any litigation with the absolute
assurance that that lawyer's tongue is tied from ever disclosing it; and any
lawyer who proves false to such an obligation, and betrays or seeks to betray
any information or any facts that he has attained while employed on the one
side, is guilty of the grossest breach of trust.... In all things he must be true
to that trust, or, failing it, he must leave the profession.
United States v. Costen, 38 F. 24, 24 (C.C.D. Colo. 1889).
114. O'Neill, supra note 113, at 394.
115. In a case in which the Supreme Court found that there is a therapist-patient
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Moreover, any exception to the duty of confidentiality that includes
a balancing test, such as the amendment to Model Rule 1.6 proposed
in this Note,' 16 increases the uncertainty of the duty. At the time the
client communicates with her attorney, she often does not know
whether the information imparted will later have historical value.'17 If
the purposes of the duty of confidentiality are to be served, clients
"must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether
particular discussions will be protected.""5 Because any type of
exception to the duty of confidentiality that includes a balancing test
will create uncertainty regarding future disclosure, the client may
chose not to reveal information she fears may later be disclosed."'
Some have argued that, in light of the several exceptions to the duty
of confidentiality that already exist, 20 adding an additional exception
would not have a substantial effect on client candor.'2 This rationale,
however, could lead to a "general erosion" of the duty, one exception
at a time." A few extra exceptions with individual marginal effects
could collectively reduce clients' willingness to tell their attorneys
embarrassing information.
Finally, an amendment to Model Rule 1.6 may not be necessary.
Many attorneys have determined on their own that the historical
privilege, the Court spoke about the importance of trust in that relationship. The
Court indicated that communications made in counseling sessions may cause
embarrassment and because of that, "the mere possibility of disclosure may impede
development of the confidential relationship necessary." Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S.
1, 10 (1996). This reasoning also applies to a lawyer-fiduciary. See In re Sealed Case,
124 F.3d 230, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Tatel, J., dissenting), revid sub nom. Swidler &
Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
116. See infra Part III.C.1.
117. Cf Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 409 ("[A] client may not know at the time he
discloses information to his attorney whether it will later be relevant to a civil or a
criminal matter, let alone whether it will be of substantial importance.").
118. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). It has been argued,
however, that:
This stress on the need for certainty.., conflicts with the underlying
rationale for the privilege. So long as attorney-client privilege is justified...
as a means to the end of maximum [client candor] courts should not neglect
the competing costs incurred by its application. Certainty... may not itself
be absolutely necessary, and even if it is, not all clients have an equal need
for its protections.
Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fred Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional
Entitlement, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 464,464 (1977).
119. The Supreme Court has made this point several times when rejecting
balancing tests for different privileges. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 409 (rejecting
a balancing test for the attorney-client privilege after the death of the client); Jaffee,
518 U.S. at 17-18 (rejecting a balancing test for a therapist-client privilege); Upjohn
Co., 449 U.S. at 393 (rejecting a balancing test for the corporate attorney-client
privilege and stating that a privilege that is not certain "is little better than no
privilege at all").
120. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (listing exceptions to Model
Rule 1.6).
121. See infra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
122 Sividler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 410.
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benefit of the information in their files is more important than the
duty of confidentiality. These lawyers have recognized the historical
value of their papers and, in contravention of their ethical duties,2 3
have disclosed confidential information, either by writing "tell-all"
books124 or by donating their files to historical repositories.
1 25  If
lawyers are willing to breach confidentiality for the sake of history, an
amendment to Model Rule 1.6 may not be needed to accomplish the
benefits of historical disclosure.
Attorneys in highly publicized cases, whether lured by money, fame
or a genuine desire to inform the public, have published books about
their representations of clients126 or the government.1 27 Some of these
attorneys have done so with the blessings of their clients,1 28 while
others may have written without consideration of their duty to keep
their clients' confidences inviolate. 29  Several factors, such as
television cameras in the courtroom, the large amount of coverage the
media give high-profile cases and "the public's insatiable appetite for
the inside story on sensational criminal trials" create increasing
temptations for lawyers involved with high-profile cases to cash in on
the public's interest and publish what they know.130
123. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, Reasonable Doubts: The O.J. Simpson Case
and the Criminal Justice System (1996); William L. Dwyer, The Goldmark Case: An
American Libel Trial (1984).
127. See, e.g., Christopher A. Darden, In Contempt (1996); Leon Jaworski, The
Right and the Power: The Prosecution of Watergate (1976); Alice Vachss, Sex Crimes
(1993).
128. After representing Claus von Bulow in a highly publicized case, Alan
Dershowitz wrote Reversal of Fortune-Inside the von Bulow Case. See In re von
Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 1987). The book "chronicle[d] the events surrounding
[von Bulow's] first criminal trial, the successful appeal, and von Bulow's ultimate
acquittal." Id. at 96. In In re von Bulow, the Second Circuit held that Reversal of
Fortune constituted a waiver of von Bulow's attorney-client privilege for matters
discussed in the book. Id. The decision was based upon, inter alia, the finding that
von Bulow "acquiesc[ed] in and encourag[ed] the publication" of the book. Id. at 100.
129. Johnny Cochran, the lead defense attorney in the O.J. Simpson trial, "has
publicly suggested that colleagues Robert Shapiro and Robert Kardashian may have
violated attorney-client confidence for money in post-trial publishing ventures." John
Gibeaut, Defend and Tell: Lawyers Who Cash in on Media Deals for Their Clients'
Stories May Wish They'd Kept Their Mouths Shut, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1996 at 64, 65; see
also Johnson, supra note 96, at 93 ("It is highly unlikely that every lawyer who has
written a book or appeared on a television talk show actually consulted with and
obtained the consent of the former clients about whose legal affairs he or she wrote or
spoke.").
130. Glavin, supra note 96, at 1809; see also Johnson, supra note 96, at 87 ("The
intense public interest in certain types of information and the hypnotic allure of
pecuniary gain attendant to its release cannot be overestimated. Some lawyers will
inevitably succumb to the temptation to breach lawyer-client confidences."). Lawyers
who violate confidentiality rules often do so without punishment because, in many
instances, these rules are simply not enforced. See infra notes 237-42 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the effect of allowing attorneys to violate the
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Additionally, a number of lawyers have donated their papers to
historical repositories. Harvard University houses the files of several
prominent retired or deceased attorneys, including Louis Brandeis,
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Felix Frankfurter, Manley 0' Hudson, Roscoe
Pound, Thomas Reed Powell and Oliver Wendell Holmes. 3' At least
some of these files are open for research. For example, Learned
Hand's papers were donated "with the stipulation that they be
prepared for research as soon as possible."' 2 The Library of Congress
also has the papers of several attorneys whose files are available for
research purposes.
133
When attorneys donate their files to historical repositories such as
Harvard or the Library of Congress, they often do not address the
duty of confidentiality."3 Before 1987, even the Library of Congress
never addressed this issue.1 35  In that year, Joseph Rauh, Jr., an
attorney who had been involved in the labor and civil rights
movements and had represented Arthur Miller before the House Un-
American Activities Committee, donated his files to the Library of
Congress.136 Rauh inquired about client confidentiality considerations
and was surprised to learn that the Library had never before dealt
with the issue.'37 After some discussion, Rauh and the Library
eventually decided that researchers would be able to look through the
files. They agreed that if an historian or journalist wished to publish
information about living clients or those with active estates, she must
obtain the consent of the former clients or the former clients'
executors.13s An historian, however, is free to publish any information
from the files of deceased clients without active estates.
39
duty of confidentiality without punishment, see infra notes 243.47 and accompanying
text. The issue of why ethics rules may be under enforced in some circumstances is
beyond the scope of this Note.
131. Marsha Trimble, Archives and Manuscripts: New Collecting Areas for Law
Libraries, 83 Law Libr. J. 429,431 (1991). Harvard's collection "of over two thousand
linear feet of papers dating from the sixteenth to the twentieth century is the largest
and most significant in any law library." Id.
132- Id
133. See R. Michael McReynolds, The Organization of American Historians
Report on Historians and Access to the Files of Lawyers-An Archivist's Review 6
(Sept. 1995) (unpublished paper presented to The Organization of American
Historians, on file with the Fordham Law Review). The list of attorneys whose
papers are in the Library of Congress includes Thomas Corcoran, Joseph Rauh, Jr.,
Thurgood Marshall, William 0. Douglas and Clement Haynsworth. Id.
134. See R. Michael McReynolds, The Archivist and Lawyers' Records 2 (Oct. 2,
1988) (Presentation to Society of American Archivists, on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
135. Kaplan, supra note 5.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. Rauh settled for this agreement because it -was the most practical one
[he] could think of." Id. For a discussion of the ethical problems involved with Rauh's
agreement, see infra note 258 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the approaches taken by various archivists to address
donations from attorneys that include client confidences may make an
amendment to allow for historical disclosure unnecessary. One such
approach is a sealed collection, an arrangement where, for a time
period, normally set by the donor, only the donor himself has access
to the files."n  Another approach is a closed collection. 4' Unlike a
sealed collection, in a closed collection the archivist processes the
papers before the collection is closed to "glean valuable information
from the papers before the archive forecloses access.' 42 In a limited
access collection, the donor sets restrictions on who has access to the
documents and under what conditions the archives may grant
access.143 Additionally, repositories may employ a screening method
in which attorneys look through papers to identify documents that
contain client confidences and remove them.1"
Because attorneys are already disclosing client confidences for
historical purposes and because archivists have developed methods to
address confidentiality concerns, an amendment to Model Rule 1.6 to
allow for historical disclosure may be unnecessary. 45
B. The Case for Permissible Historical Disclosure
Despite the importance of maintaining client confidences, some
have argued for disclosure of client information for historical
documentation. Mainly, commentators argue that such disclosure
could provide overwhelming historical benefit 14 6 and there is little
evidence to show that such an exception would significantly chill
clients' communications with their attorneys.
1. The Historical Benefit of Attorney Records
Regardless of how one feels about the propriety of lawyers making
their confidential files available to researchers, such a practice would
benefit the study of history. Attorneys shape history because they are
involved "in events and with persons in the forefront of historical
movements." 48 Their files contain the details of important people and
140. Hobbs, supra note 96, at 195.
141. Id. at 196.
142. Id.
143. See id. Joseph Rauh's agreement with the Library of Congress appears to be a
limited access agreement. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
144. Hobbs, supra note 96, at 197.
145. But see infra notes 243-62 and accompanying text (arguing that
nonenforcement of the current confidentiality rule creates disrespect for all of the
ethics rules and that the methods developed by archivists to deal with the issue do not
fully protect client confidences).
146. See infra Part II.B.1.
147. See infra Part II.B.2.
148. Hobbs, supra note 96, at 211; see also Trimble, supra note 131, at 442
("[L]awyers have always played such a predominant role in our society.").
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events "and document an ever-changing society."'49  These stories
cannot be told if ethics rules remain in their present form.'-"
Lawyers' files may improve the accuracy of historical studies by
"fill[ing] in important gaps" that are left by the initial recording of
history.5 Properly documenting history is important because a
country that celebrates its heritage should "have no illusions about its
past.' 1 52 For example, what if Lee Harvey Oswald had not acted
alone? It can hardly be argued that history books are complete if he
had indeed acted with co-conspirators and the information is now
languishing in an attorney's files, forever sealed by Model Rule 1.6.
Attorneys have made disclosures that have informed history despite
the duty of confidentiality. In 1913, Leo Frank, a Jew, was convicted
of murdering Mary Phagan, a thirteen-year old girl employed at his
factory in Georgia.153 His conviction was later attributed to anti-
Semitism.' s ' After Frank was sentenced to death, Governor Jack
Slaton commuted his sentence to life in prison.'5 5 William Smith, the
attorney for Jim Conley,156 another employee of the factory," was
among those who petitioned Slaton to commute Frank's sentence.,'
After Frank's conviction, Smith disclosed to the trial judge that
Conley had confessed to Smith that he was at the factory the day
Phagan was murdered.5 9 Conley, who had been drinking that day,
remembered struggling with a girl and later seeing her dead body in
the basement. 6" He hid the body and fled from the factory.'61 Smith's
disclosure not only contributed to the commutation of Frank's
sentence, but also provides more evidence for historians that Frank
was innocent. 62 Thus, Leo Frank's story may be used to illustrate the
benefits of lawyers' disclosures in correcting misunderstandings of
events that have shaped history.1613
149. Hobbs, supra note 96, at 211.
150. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
151. In re Am. Historical Ass'n, 49 F. Supp. 2d 274,297 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
152. Street v. NBC, 645 F.2d 1227, 1236 (6th Cir. 1981).
153. Nancy MacLean, Gender, Sexuality, and the Politics of Lynching: The Leo
Frank Case Revisited, in Under Sentence of Death: Lynching in the South 158, 158
(W. Fitzhugh Brundage ed., 1997).
154. Daly, supra note 62, at 1619 n.31.
155. Arthur G. Powell, I Can Go Home Again 289 (1943). Unfortunately, soon
after the commutation, a mob broke into the prison where Frank was being held and
lynched him. Id. at 291.
156. See Robert Seitz Frey & Nancy Thompson-Frey, The Silent and the Damned:
The Murder of Mary Phagan and the Lynching of Leo Frank 38 (1988).
157. Id. at 15.
158. Id. at 78.
159. Id. at 58.
160. Id. at 58-59.
161. Id. at 59.
162. Georgia posthumously pardoned Frank in 1986. Id. at 156.
163. Smith was not the only one who had confidential information that confirmed
Frank's innocence. Arthur Powell, a Georgia attorney during the Frank affair,
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Some courts have addressed the historical exception issue in other
fields of law, such as grand jury testimony. Although Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2) mandates that testimony before a grand
jury remain confidential," courts have developed a history-based
exception to this rule. 65 Arguably, the crafting of an historical
exception to Rule 6(e)(2) is relevant to Model Rule 1.6 because one of
the reasons for the grand jury secrecy rule is similar to an oft-stated
justification for the lawyer's duty of confidentiality- that it
encourages full and frank disclosure)6
In In re American Historical Ass'n,"7 a federal court considered
whether to compel the Justice Department to release transcripts of
testimony before two grand juries that investigated Alger Hiss,'I
ultimately deciding to order release of most of the requested portions
of the transcripts.' 9 In ordering the disclosure, the court found that
the "public must acquire, at an appropriate time, a significant, if not
compelling, interest in ensuring the pages of history are based upon
the fullest possible record." '
The court made its determination by considering two plausible
interests in keeping the material confidential.' Most importantly for
the purposes of this Note, the court was concerned that future
witnesses before a grand jury would be less forthcoming because of
fears that their testimony would later be disclosed."' Although the
court found this interest to be significant,' it was not enough to
prevent the release of most of the requested material when other
factors such as the historical importance of the transcripts were
published a book in 1943. See Powell, supra note 155. In his discussion of the Frank
case, he indicated that he knew who actually killed Phagan and implied that he
obtained the information when someone attempted to retain him as counsel. See id. at
291. Powell wrote that he would write down what he knew and seal it for later
release. Id. at 291-92. No such letter from Powell, however, has been found. See Frey
& Frey, supra note 156, at 137.
164. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2).
165. See infra notes 167-75 and accompanying text (discussing In re Am. Historical
Ass'n).
166. See supra notes 77-79.
167. 49 F. Supp. 2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
168. See id. at 277-78. In 1948, Whittaker Chambers, an admitted Communist,
accused Alger Hiss, a former high-ranking State Department official, of spying for the
Soviet Union. Id. at 279. The allegations "received immediate and focused public
attention" because of the prominent positions that Hiss had held and because of his
powerful friends. Id. Hiss was eventually convicted of perjury. Id. at 277.
169. Seeid. at297.
170. Id. at 295.
171. Id. at 292.
172. Id. The second interest the court considered was the "interest in protecting the
privacy" of others investigated in the grand jury proceedings whose names were not
disclosed. Id. at 292. The court addressed this consideration by refusing to order the
release of some of the pages of testimony. Id. at 293.
173. Id. at 292 (stating that this "interest should not be underestimated").
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considered.17 4  The court indicated that it was "confident that
disclosure will fill in important gaps in the existing historical record,
foster further academic and other critical discussion of the far-ranging
issues raised by the Hiss case, and lead to additional noteworthy
historical works on those subjects, all to the immense benefit of the
public."175
In addition to providing history with more complete information
about specific cases, some have argued that allowing attorneys to
donate their confidential client files would open up the work of courts
to public scrutiny. The justice system "play[s] a critical role in a
democratic state and ... the public has a legitimate interest" in
observing that role. 76  As James Madison said, "[a] popular
Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring
it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both."'"
Lawyers play a substantial role in the justice system and, therefore are
uniquely situated to inform the public about the workings of courts7'7
When attorneys reveal their experience with the legal system, they
"enhance public understanding of the underlying incident, serving
academic as well as practical functions."'' The disclosing attorney
shows the public how its government and court system operate, which
is important knowledge for citizens in a democracy."' The country
174. See id at 278, 297.
175. Id. at 297. Other cases have addressed these issues and reached similar
conclusions about the release of grand jury testimony for historical benefit. See, e.g.,
In re Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 105, 107 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that historical interest on its
own can justify release of grand jury material but declining to order release in the
immediate case). But see Hiss v. Dep't. of Justice, 441 F. Supp. 69, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(denying a request for release of grand jury testimony because of public interest and
calling such an idea "mischievous").
176. Comm. on Prof'I Responsibility, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York,
The Need for Fair Trials Does Not Justify a Disciplinary Rule That Broadly Restricts
an Attorney's Speech, 20 Fordham Urb. L.J. 881.881 (1993).
177. Glavin, supra note 96, at 1843 (quoting Letter from James Madison to W.T.
Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 The Writings of James Madison, 1819-1836, at 103 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1910)).
178. See Johnson, supra note 96, at 96-97 ("Lawyers are the best poised to keep the
public informaed [sic] because they directly participate in and are responsible for the
administration of justice.").
179. Luna, supra note 96, at 182; see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978) ("The operations of the courts and the judicial
conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern."); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S.
214, 218-20 (1966) (discussing the importance of free information about the
government).
180. See Johnson, supra note 96, at 87 ("The public's 'right to know' about matters
affecting the administration of justice goes to the heart of life in an open and vibrant
democracy."); see also Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor, the Press, and Free
Speech, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 865, 883 (1990) ("The [Supreme] Court has recognized a
state interest in fostering confidence in and preventing public misunderstanding of the
judicial process."); Glavin, supra note 96, at 1843 ("The public interest in
understanding how its government and representatives operate is a basic tenet of our
democracy.").
2761
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
"depends on 'robust debate' to determine the best answer to public
controversies" '181 and such debate is possible only if sufficient
information is available to the debaters."8  Allowing attorneys to
make their files available would provide some of this information.
2. Intuitive and Empirical Arguments for Historical Disclosure
An exception to Model Rule 1.6 to allow for historical disclosure
may not significantly affect client candor. The duty of confidentiality
is justified because it encourages clients to communicate fully and
frankly with their attorneys.183 There is little evidence, however, that
allowing lawyers to make their files available for historical benefit
would stop clients from openly communicating with their
representatives. Legal scholars criticize the justifications for the
confidentiality rule on both intuitive and empirical grounds.
Several legal scholars have questioned the premise that clients
would be less forthcoming absent a promise of confidentiality because
it is in the client's own self-interest to be candid." In the complicated
legal environment of American society, people often need attorneys'
assistance. When a lawyer indicates that she needs complete
information to provide adequate representation, the client is likely to
disclose all of the relevant facts." A client who receives poor
assistance from his attorney because he did not provide full
information "has only himself to blame."'8 6  Furthermore, many
clients need immediate legal assistance simply to function, such as in
an ongoing commercial transaction. In these instances, "the added
inducement of confidentiality is unnecessary to encourage the client's
candor."'"
181. Street v. NBC, 645 F.2d 1227, 1236 (6th Cir. 1981).
182. For a discussion of the importance of a general "right to know" in a
democratic society, see Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know,
1976 Wash. U. L.Q. 1.
183. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 81, at 674; Zacharias, supra note 20, at 356-76;
Subin, supra note 13, at 1163-66.
185. Subin, supra note 13, at 1163.
[The] very need [for legal services] suggests that potential clients will use
lawyers even if confidentiality is circumscribed. As matters become
complex, laypersons have no choice but to consult the experts. The threat of
being sued or the need to sue for redress of grievances necessarily drives
clients to lawyers.
Zacharias, supra note 20, at 364.
186. Zacharias, supra note 20, at 366; see also City of San Francisco v. Superior
Court, 231 P.2d 26, 30 (Cal. 1951) (en banc) ("Unless [the client] makes known to the
lawyer all the facts, the advice which follows will be useless, if not misleading; the
lawsuit will be conducted along improper lines, the trial will be full of surprises, much
useless litigation may result." (internal quotation omitted)).
187. Subin, supra note 13, at 1164-65; see also Rhode, supra note 81, at 674
("Historical, cross-cultural, and cross-professional research makes clear that
practitioners [of other professions such as accounting and social work] have long
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Additionally, the myriad of existing exceptions to the
confidentiality ruleiss may call into question whether clients really
understand the scope of the protections they are afforded. If clients
speak freely to their attorneys after a full explanation of the
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality, some argue that the
justification for confidentiality becomes questionable.' A fully
informed client could not be confident "as to what could safely be
revealed." 190 If a lawyer, however, does not ensure that his clients
fully understand the limits to confidentially, then another justification
of the duty not to disclose-client autonomy-is sacrificed,' because
confidentiality helps clients make informed decisions, which
"enhances their dignity and autonomy."' 19 Manipulation of clients
hardly increases client autonomy.' 93  An attorney "who seeks to
encourage the client to reveal all by stating a rule of absolute
confidentiality is hardly faithful" to client autonomy." Moreover,
some clients, despite honest attempts by attorneys to explain the rules,
"are likely to remain confused at least as to details."' 95
Even if clients fully understand the confidentiality rules, they may
still withhold information from their attorneys. For instance, clients
may not believe their lawyers' promises of confidentiality!" Despite
their assurances of confidentiality, attorneys have indicated that some
clients are still reluctant to tell all; indeed, some clients even lie to
their lawyers. 197 One practicing attorney recently noted that only "a
naive lawyer... believes that clients tell everything."'" Clients are
most likely to be frank with a lawyer with whom they have a lasting
attorney-client relationship. 199 That type of relationship creates a trust
which "cannot be institutionalized by any code of ethics.""' Thus,
provided counseling on confidential matters without the sweeping protections from
disclosure that the American bar has now obtained.").
188. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (listing the exceptions to Model
Rule 1.6).
189. See Subin, supra note 13, at 1165.
190. Id.
191. See id2 at 1166; see also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 414
(1998) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[A]n attorney who tells his client that the
expected communications are absolutely and forever privileged is oversimplifying a
bit." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
192. Zacharias, supra note 20, at 381 (internal quotations omitted).
193. Id.
194. See Subin, supra note 13, at 1166.
195. Zacharias, supra note 20, at 365.
196. See Subin, supra note 13, at 1163; see also Rhode, supra note 81, at 674
("[W]hatever the rules, many individuals will be unwilling to trust their lawyers with
compromising disclosures.").
197. Subin, supra note 13, at 1164.
198. Sharp, supra note 78, at 81.
199. 1&
200. Id
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confidentiality rules may not necessarily serve to enhance the
attorney-client relationship.
Empirical studies have, to some degree, supported these intuitive
attacks on the theoretical underpinnings of the duty of confidentiality.
The two empirical studies conducted with regard to attorney-client
confidentiality call into question the justifications for the duty. 0' In
1962, the Yale Law Journal conducted a study of the importance and
effect of the attorney-client privilege, primarily in comparison with
other professions.2" The journal surveyed a number of attorneys,
members of other professions and laypeople.20 3 Although the Yale
study results should not be given too much weight because the
researchers did not use scientific sampling techniques, °4 the results
still "provide valuable food for thought. ' 25 According to the Yale
study, only about half of the laypersons surveyed felt that elimination
of the attorney-client privilege would deter clients from speaking
candidly with their attorneys.0 6  Additionally, only 71 of 108
nonlawyers knew that attorneys are generally not allowed to disclose
confidential client information.2° These results indicate that although
confidentiality has some effect on client disclosures, it is questionable
"whether the effect is as substantial as proponents of confidentiality
presume. ' 208 The Yale study at least shows that the degree to which
confidentiality rules facilitate client disclosure is not obvious 2 9 and
may "call into question the need for unlimited attorney-client
confidentiality rules.- 210
A more recent study seems to support the Yale Law Journal's
findings. In 1989, Professor Fred Zacharias undertook his own
empirical study of confidentiality. 211  He conducted a survey of
practicing attorneys and laypeople in Tompkins County, New York.
While Professor Zacharias' study suffers from similar limitations to
the Yale study,213 the results nonetheless offer some insights into how
201. See Zacharias, supra note 20; Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer
and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine,
71 Yale L.J. 1226 (1962).
202. See Note, supra note 201.
203. See id. at 1226-27.
204. See Zacharias, supra note 20, at 377 n.119 ("First, the number of subjects was
limited. Second, subjects were not chosen with sufficient randomness to assure the
significance of the results. Third, the study was conducted by a legal periodical,
without statistical rigor." (citations omitted)).
205. Id.
206. See Note, supra note 201, at 1236 n.59.
207. See id. at 1239 n.81.
208. Zacharias, supra note 20, at 378.
209. Id. at 379.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 352.
212. Id. at 379.
213. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. Professor Zacharias recognized
the limitations of his study. See Zacharias, supra note 20, at 396 ("1 would be the first
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attorneys and clients view the duty of confidentiality, how that view
affects how they act and the degree to which lawyers misunderstand
the importance of nondisclosure to client candor.' 4
Although the results of Professor Zacharias' study support the idea
that the nondisclosure rule "serves confidentiality's basic
rationales,"215 some of his findings call into question whether an
additional exception to Model Rule 1.6 would have a chilling effect on
client disclosure. According to the study, about half of the lay
respondents stated that they would withhold information from their
lawyers if there were no confidentiality guarantee. 2 ' Moreover,
slightly less than a third indicated that they have given information to
their lawyers that they would have withheld absent promises of
confidentiality.217 The responses suggest, however, "that many clients
give information not because of confidentiality guarantees, but
because they view lawyers as honorable professionals who customarily
promise discretion. '218 The study revealed that many lay respondents
misunderstood attorney confidentiality rules in relationship to
confidentiality rules that may or may not govern other professions. A
large percentage thought that doctors, psychologists and psychiatrists
are just as obligated to preserve confidences as attorneys.2' 9 Even
though lawyers are governed by more stringent nondisclosure rules,
most nonlawyer respondents indicated that they would give
information more readily to priests, doctors, psychologists or
psychiatrists than to attorneys." This result casts doubt on the
importance and emphasis that attorneys and the ABA place on strict
confidentiality rules."'
Additionally, the Zacharias study calls into question whether clients
actually believe promises of attorney confidentiality.m Less than
twenty percent of lay respondents believed that attorneys always keep
matters confidentialY- Arguably, if clients do not believe promises of
to caution against overreliance on the Tompkins County study. Its sampling was
limited, though substantial, and its methodology somewhat unscientific.").
214. Zacharias, supra note 20, at 380-81.
215. Id. at 380.
216. Id-
217. Id. at 381.
218. Id. This view is congruent with how some early courts viewed the attorney-
client privilege. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 1061, 1070 (1978) (indicating that some of
the earliest cases that recognized the attorney-client privilege based it on the idea that
"a gentlemen does not give away matters confided to him").
219. See Zacharias, supra note 20, at 384.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (stating that clients may not believe
attorney promises of confidentiality).
223. See Zacharias, supra note 20, at 383.
2765
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
confidentiality to begin with, an additional disclosure option would
have minimal effect on client frankness.
The study asked if the laypeople would communicate with their
attorneys candidly if there were no guarantee of confidentiality,
assuming that lawyers would normally keep their information
secret. 24 Most respondents answered that they would not be frank.2 -
They were then asked if they would still withhold information if the
attorney guaranteed confidentiality except for "specific types of
information which he/she described in advance. '226 In response,
approximately fifteen percent said they would still withhold
information.227 Fifteen percent is a small percentage, especially in
comparison to the slightly more than eleven percent of laypersons
who indicated that they currently withhold information from their
attorneys under the rules now in place.228 As a result, based on this
study, "[l]iberalizing disclosure exceptions apparently would not have
a significant impact on most clients."229
Because of the immense potential benefit of historical disclosure
and the arguments that a new exception would not have a substantial
impact on client communications, an historical disclosure exception to
the duty of confidentiality should be adopted. The next part
concludes that the conflict between the duty of confidentiality and the
demands of history can be resolved in a manner that addresses both
concerns. Part III discusses the reasons for adopting an amendment
allowing disclosure for historical purposes. It then reviews previous
attempts to address historical disclosure of client information and
analyzes the shortcomings of these attempts. Finally, addressing the
problems in the previous proposals, Part III sets forth an amendment
to Model Rule 1.6 that authorizes historical disclosure.
III. A NEW PROPOSAL TO AMEND MODEL RULE 1.6 TO ALLOW FOR
HISTORICAL DISCLOSURE
While there is currently a conflict between attorney confidentiality
rules and the possible historical benefits of information in attorney
files, an amendment to those rules could address both concerns. A
few commentators have recognized the benefits of historical
disclosure and have suggested amendments to the duty of
confidentiality. While these proposals have a laudable goal, they do
not adequately address significant issues that arise in crafting this type
of exception, such as improper motive and the proper time period for
disclosure.
224. Id. at 386.
225. Id.
226. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 395.
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A. Reasons to Adopt an Amendment for Historical Disclosure
Because historical disclosure can be immensely beneficial,' an
exception to the duty of confidentiality should be adopted. Intuitive
and empirical arguments against the justifications for confidentiality~'3
show that an exception for historical disclosure, if properly crafted,
would not compromise client candor. The amendment proposed in
this Note allows disclosure only after the death of the client. Once a
deceased client's estate has been settled and the client is beyond the
reach of both physical and financial harm, the only reason for concern
about post-death disclosure is possible harm to reputation.-2 To
suggest that clients have a great concern about how future generations
view their communications with their attorneys, "[o]ne would have to
attribute [to them] a Pharaoh-like concern for immortality." 3 While
this may be an exaggeration, it is likely that in the "high-adrenalin
situation likely to provoke consultation with counsel," posthumous
reputational interests are likely not a predominant concern.' Given
Professor Zacharias' finding that a limited exception, if explained in
advance, would only marginally affect client candor, -5 an exception to
allow for disclosure in some circumstances after the client's death will
likely have little effect on client frankness.
Furthermore, while it may be argued that because attorneys are
already donating their files, an historical disclosure exception to
Model Rule 1.6 is unnecessary, - 6 this argument misses an important
point. The fact that attorneys already donate their papers in
contravention of Model Rule 1.6 without punishment is evidence that
steps need to be taken either to ensure compliance with the rule or to
change it. One possibility is more stringent enforcement and
punishment for violating attorneys by the state attorney discipline
boards.237  This approach, however, does not consider the vast
230. See supra Part II.B.1.
231. See supra Part II.B.2.
232. See Hood, supra note 18, at 767. Cf Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524
U.S. 399, 412 (1998) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I agree that a deceased client may
retain a personal, reputational, and economic interest in confidentiality. But, after
death, the potential that disclosure will harm the client's interests has been greatly
diminished .... (citations omitted)).
233. 24 Wright & Graham, supra note 14, § 5498, at 484. But see supra note 102
(arguing that clients likely do care about their reputation after their death).
234. In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nora. Swidler
& Berlin v. United States. 524 U.S. 399 (1998). In that case, the court also stated that
against the posthumous reputational interest, the client "may even view history's
claims to truth as more deserving." Id.
235. See supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 123-39 and accompanying text.
237. See D'Alessio v. Gilberg, 617 N.Y.S.2d 484, 485 (App. Div. 1994) (-So strong
is the State's regard for the confidentiality of attorney-client communications that an
attorney exposes himself to possible disciplinary charges if he fails to keep
confidential a communication from his client without the client's consent.");
Pizzimenti, supra note 11, at 463 ("[A] state disciplinary board may discipline an
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potential benefits of historical disclosure.238 Moreover, those charged
with enforcement of attorney ethics might not be interested in taking
up this charge. For example, Robert Saltzman, President-Elect of the
National Organization of Bar Counsel,239 recently indicated that,
absent a complaint about an attorney donating files that contained
confidential information of deceased clients to an historical
repository, "it's not likely that a disciplinary agency would open an
investigation on its own."24 Another possibility is for clients to sue
their attorneys for breach.24 Clients, however, are either uninterested
in this course of action or do not have sufficient means available to
protect their rights.242 Thus, tighter enforcement does not appear to
be the best option.
If the duty of confidentiality is not going to be enforced to prevent
attorneys from donating their files to historical repositories, Model
Rule 1.6 should be amended. If one rule is not enforced, respect for
all ethics rules is diminished. Nonenforcement of Model Rule 1.6
"teaches lawyers to consider noncompliance with other rules that
should be followed."243 As President Theodore Roosevelt once stated,
failure to enforce the law inevitably breeds "contempt for law." '244 If
Model Rule 1.6 is not enforced in cases of historical disclosure,
compliance with the ethical rules "becomes haphazard." '245 Some
attorneys will feel obligated to follow the disclosure prohibition "even
if the bar does not intend to enforce it across the board," while other
lawyers will not feel the same obligation.246 As a result, clients who
attorney for violating the ethical responsibility to remain silent.").
238. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the potential benefits of historical disclosure).
239. The National Organization of Bar Counsel is an association of lawyers whose
members enforce attorney ethics rules. Nat'l Org. of Bar Counsel, NOBC, at
http://www.nobc.org/ (last visited Mar. 28,2001).
240. Telephone Interview with Robert Saltzman, President-Elect, National
Organization of Bar Counsel (Mar. 4,2001) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
241. See 2 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 14.6, at 557
(5th ed. 2000) ("Malpractice liability can be predicated on a breach of a
confidentiality. The attorney's motive in breaching the duty of confidentiality is not
material since an unauthorized disclosure is the wrong."); Pizzimenti, supra note 11,
at 463 ("[C]lients can maintain various civil causes of action for disclosure of...
confidences.").
242. Apparently, no lawyer has been sued for donating his papers to a repository.
See Trimble, supra note 131, at 445.
243. Zacharias, supra note 20, at 355 (emphasis omitted).
244. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the
Corporate Income Tax, 66 Ind. L.J. 53, 63 n.30 (1990) (citing Seventh Annual
Message, 42 Cong. Rec. 67, 68 (Dec. 3, 1907)); see also Kenneth R. Davis, A Model
for Arbitration Law: Autonomy, Cooperation and Curtailment of State Power, 26
Fordham Urb. L.J. 167, 176 (1999) ("When law is not enforced, society suffers
because legal norms erode. Legal norms need exercise like muscles, and they will
atrophy from disuse.").
245. Zacharias, supra note 20, at 354.
246. Id.
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rely on the prohibitions on disclosure may be deceived. "47 Therefore,
the integrity of the Model Rules would be best protected by amending
Model Rule 1.6 to cover historical disclosure and provide guidelines
for what some attorneys are already doing with regard to disclosure of
client information.24
Archivists have developed various means to deal with the issue of
confidential client information in attorney files, including sealed
collections, closed collections, limited access collections and attorney
screening.24 These solutions, however, do not solve the problem of
Model Rule 1.6 violations. 5 A sealed collection, in which only the
donor has access to the files for a specified period of time, ' may
protect client confidences in the immediate future, but most are only
sealed for a set time.52 When the collection is opened, the duty of
client confidentiality is violated. 3 If the collection is never opened,
the beneficial historical information that the files contain' is never
released. Indeed, it is pointless for an attorney to donate her files to
an historical repository if they will never be opened for research
purposes.
A closed collection, in which archivists sift through the files before
the collection is sealed, 5 also does not withstand Model Rule 1.6
scrutiny. When the archivists review the documents before closing the
collection, client confidences are exposed to the eyes of someone
other than the client's attorney.
A limited access collection, in which the donor dictates who has
access and under what conditions,256 likewise does not adequately
address confidentiality issues. Regardless of the restrictions that the
donating attorney puts on access to the collection, he is still allowing
others to look through files that contain client confidences. Joseph
Rauh's agreement with the Library of Congress,' for example, is
247. See id. This lack of enforcement "breeds distrust of law yers" because
observers see that "at least some lawyers are willing to disobey ethical regulations."
Id.
248. See id at 354 n.15 ("Arguably, nonenforcement incorporates de facto
exceptions into the strict confidentiality rules, thereby changing the prevailing law
without forethought and debate.").
249. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
250. See Legal Ethics Comm. of the D.C. Bar, Op. 128 (1983) (-Donor-imposed
restrictions on access to papers disclosing client confidences or secrets are not
sufficient to avoid the ethical restrictions on disclosure unless they are agreed to by
the affected clients.")
251. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
252. Id.
253. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (stating that the duty of
confidentiality is perpetual).
254. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the potential benefits to history of
information in lawyers' files).
255. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
2769
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
subject to this criticism. Even if researchers do not publish
information about living clients obtained from Rauh's files, they are
still accessing information protected by the duty of confidentiality.28
Even the attorney screening method, in which attorneys other than
the client's attorney look through the donated files and remove
documents that contain client confidences, 9 violates Model Rule 1.6.
While confidential client information is kept from the public with this
method, that information is still being disclosed to someone outside
the lawyer-client relationship. The lawyers retained by the repository
to screen the files obtain access to this information. The fact that they
are attorneys does not constitute an adequate justification: they do
not represent the client's interests. Model Rule 1.6 does not contain
an exception for disclosure to other attorneys .2 1 Additionally, some
consider this review as a mere token exercise that does not actually
serve to protect clients.26'
Finally, while the above methods may provide some protections,
archivists most commonly ignore the duty of confidentiality
altogether,2 62 which obviously does not protect clients. With attorneys
and archivists failing to handle confidential files appropriately, the
donating process should be covered by rules that afford the client
better protection.
Because of the potential benefits that an historical disclosure
exception would provide,263 the likelihood that such an exception
would have a minimal effect on client candor,2 64 and the fact that
attorneys are already making such disclosure without protecting client
confidences,2 65 an exception to the duty of confidentiality must be
adopted. Realizing the importance of disclosure for historical
purposes, others have attempted to create such an exception. The
next section analyzes these previous proposals to allow for historical
disclosure.
258. Professor Freedman criticized the Rauh agreement because it allows
researchers to look through files without clients' consent. Kaplan, supra note 5.
259. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
260. See Model Rules, supra note 7, R. 1.6 (b) (listing exceptions to confidentiality,
none of which authorizes disclosure to other attorneys simply because they are
attorneys).
261. See McReynolds, supra note 134, at 2.
262. Law libraries were asked in a 1991 survey if their "confidential collections"
were "open for research." Trimble, supra note 131, at 450. The overwhelming
majority indicated that the collections were open-most with some restrictions. Id.
Five libraries indicated that their confidential collections were closed either for a term
of years (ranging from four to fifty) or until the death of the donor. No library
indicated that the confidential collections would never be opened. Id; see also
McReynolds, supra note 134, at 7 (stating that the Huntington Library in California,
which houses a large number of law-related manuscripts, sees "the problem of client
confidentiality as the responsibility of the donor").
263. See supra Part II.B.1.
264. See supra notes 183-229, 232-35 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 131-39, 236-62 and accompanying text.
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B. Previous Attempts to Craft an Historical Disclosure Exception
Legal scholars have previously recognized the potential benefits of
an historical disclosure exception to the duty of confidentiality and
have proposed such an exception. 6 Unfortunately, these proposed
amendments to the duty of confidentiality do not address many of the
problems raised by such an exception.
The most comprehensive attempt to address the issue was
undertaken in a student Note by Bonnie Hobbs in 1992.167 Hobbs
proposed that the following rule be added to ethics codes:
(A) A lawyer may disclose information relating to the
representation of a client, including information in written form,
that the lawyer reasonably believes to be of historical significance,
for the sole purpose of research and scholarship use,
(1) with the informed consent of an individual client or entity
client, or
(2) with the consent of a deceased or dissolved client's
representative.
The lawyer may disclose the information only after full disclosure to
and consultation with the client or the client's representative, and
under such terms and conditions as the client or representative may
dictate, including any restrictions the client or representative may
wish to impose upon access to papers left in the possession of an
archivist or institution.
(B) If, after making every reasonable attempt to obtain consent, the
lawyer
(1) is unable to locate the client or a representative, and consent
is therefore unavailable, or
266. See Johnson, supra note 96, at 98; infra notes 277-85 and accompanying text
(discussing Johnson's proposal); see also Hobbs, supra note 96, at 202; infra notes 267-
76 and accompanying text (discussing Hobbs' proposal). Some suggestions have
involved the prosecutor's duty of confidentiality. For example, a student Note in 1995
suggested a rule to govern when prosecutors may disclose information after the end of
prosecution. See Glavin, supra note 96, at 1846-47. This proposed rule, however,
addresses from whom the prosecutor should obtain consent before disclosure, id., and
therefore is not inconsistent with Model Rule 1.6. A student piece from 1998 about
post-case prosecutorial disclosure is slightly more relevant. See Luna, supra note 96, at
165. The author suggested a rule that implicitly authorizes prosecutors to make
disclosures and simply states, "[wihen considering if the waiver of her duty of
confidentiality is in the public's interest, a prosecutor should consider the totality of
circumstances." Id. at 185-86. Luna's Note also suggested commentary listing the
factors that a prosecutor should consider when making the decision to disclose. Id. at
186. These factors, however, do not include an assessment of the historical benefit of
the disclosure. See id.
267. Hobbs, supra note 96.
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(2) the lawyer makes a good faith determination that obtaining
consent will be excessively burdensome or otherwise
impracticable, and
(3) there is no previous agreement with the client regarding the
disposition of the information.
The lawyer may disclose the information twenty-five years after the
death of the client or the dissolution of an entity client, subject to
whatever terms and conditions the lawyer may deem necessary or
appropriate.268
Hobbs' proposed rule does not provide sufficient protection for client
confidences. Most problematically, Hobbs' exception would allow
attorneys to disclose information that they deem has historical value
twenty-five years after the death of the client 69 without a
consideration of the negative impact of such disclosure or positive
impact of the information if released earlier. Specifically, this time
limit on the duty of confidentiality does not take into account that a
disclosure may cause harm to the deceased client's reputation or
embarrassment to his family.27  It also does not contemplate
information that could be released sooner than twenty-five years
without negative consequences. Such a broad, and, yet, at the same
time, rigid exception would undermine any encouragement
confidentiality may give clients to be full and frank with their
attorneys.271 At the same time, it would not allow disclosure of
information that could be beneficial to historians in a prompt
manner.
272
268. Id. at 202.
269. Id. The principal drafter of the Model Rules has suggested that there may
already be a time limit on the duty in the Model Rules. In 1988, Geoffrey Hazard told
the National Law Journal:
Although I admit the rule on its terms speaks in perpetuity, any rule is
always external to some social context and any system of rules contemplates
that balance. Here, you've got to weigh the protection of confidences
against our writing of history. My own view is that once all the players are
dead and you skip a generation-say, 25 years-confidentiality ought not
apply.
Kaplan, supra note 5.
270. Arguably, Part (A) of Hobbs' amendment addresses potential embarrassment
or harm to the client and his family by requiring the informed consent of the client or,
in the case of a deceased client, his representative. See Hobbs, supra note 96, at 202.
An embarrassed client or family member would likely not consent to the disclosure.
If the attorney is unable to locate the client to obtain consent, however, then Part (B)
of Hobbs' proposal goes into effect and the information may be released twenty-five
years after the client's death. Id. Considerations of potential embarrassment to the
client or his family are not required in such a situation.
271. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (explaining that one justification
of the duty of confidentiality is to encourage clients to tell their attorneys all relevant
information). But see supra notes 184-87, 224-29 and accompanying text (providing
intuitive and empirical evidence that the duty of confidentiality may not affect
whether clients are candid with their attorneys).
272. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the benefits of such information).
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Furthermore, the rule proposed by Hobbs provides lawyers with
wide discretion when deciding whether to make historical disclosures,
but does not address outside influences that might tempt attorneys to
abuse that discretion. Even with the strict confidentiality rules
currently in place, attorneys have succumbed to desires for financial
profits and have disclosed client confidences for pecuniary gain.-m
Under the Hobbs proposal, the same lure of monetary gain' may be
present, but after twenty-five years the ethical prohibitions will be
gone. Once the protection period has expired, some attorneys
undoubtedly will make the decision to disclose based not on the
altruistic motive of informing history, but on the money that they will
receive. The long time lapse may diminish this concern somewhat
because public interest, and therefore the potential lucrativeness of
disclosure, will wane with time in many cases. In many highly
publicized cases, however, interest can be great more than twenty-five
years after the death of the client, and thus the attorney may still
benefit even after the time lapse 6  Any rule, such as the one
proposed by Hobbs, that gives attorneys such broad discretion must
include restrictions that will prevent lawyers from abusing that
discretion.
In 1998, Hannibal Johnson also advocated an exception to the
confidentiality rule.2 7 Johnson's rule is as follows:
Public communication, oral or written, by a lawyer of information
relating to representation of a former client is generally discouraged.
In those cases in which the lawyer desires publicly to communicate
information relating to the representation of a former client, the
lawyer should seek both to consult with the former client with
respect to [the] subject [to] which the prospective disclosure pertains
and to obtain said former client's consent to the prospective
disclosure. Factors to be considered by a lawyer, in his or her
considered discretion, in determining whether disclosure of such
information is proper in the absence of client consultation and
consent include:
273. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
274. An attorney in possession of valuable information could receive many benefits
including:(i) lucrative book deals (and, to a lesser extent, sales of sensational stories to
tabloids); (ii) appearances on talk shows (calculated, of course, to generate
book sales and promote the business and professional interests of the guest);(iii) high-dollar speaking engagements and public appearances and (iv)
fame for its own sake (i.e., self-promotion).
Johnson, supra note 96, at 87.
275. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
276. There can be little doubt that the attorney with the hypothetical information
about Lee Harvey Oswald from the Introduction, see supra notes 1-5 and
accompanying text, could benefit financially from that information even today, almost
forty years after Oswald's death.
277. Johnson, supra note 96.
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(a) The potentiality, extent, and nature of the harm to the
former client which may result from the disclosure;
(b) The benefit to the public which may result from disclosure;
(c) The impact on the public perception of the legal profession
of the disclosure;
(d) The extent to which the information sought to be disclosed
has become generally known or may become generally known
from an alternative source; and
(e) The impact of the disclosure on the administration of justice
and the harm of the public which may result in the absence of
the disclosure.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a lawyer shall not disclose, in the
absence of client consultation and consent, matters communicated
to the lawyer in confidence by the client during the representation if
such matters are subject to the lawyer-client evidentiary privilege.278
Johnson's rule does not explicitly refer to disclosures for the benefit of
history, but states that one of the factors an attorney should consider
when deciding whether to disclose client information is "[t]he benefit
to the public which may result from the disclosure."279 Because the
basis of an historical disclosure exception to confidentiality is that
such disclosure could benefit the public,10 Johnson's rule covers such
an exception.
While Johnson's proposal would allow some form of historical
disclosure, it fails to address some serious concerns. Similar to the
Hobbs proposal, Johnson's rule does not address the financial
incentives that may lure an attorney to disclose client confidences.
281
Additionally, the scope of the rule is unclear. The proposed
exception states that the attorney cannot disclose any information that
would be covered by the attorney-client privilege absent client
consent.' While much of the information that is covered by the
attorney-client privilege would be the same information that is
protected by the duty of confidentiality, the two doctrines are not the
same,283 and they have different exceptions.284 Johnson's proposal
would adopt a rule that is intended only to govern when lawyers can
be compelled to testify to establish the ethical duties of an attorney.
Furthermore, the attorney-client privilege extends past the death of
278. Id. at 98.
279. Id.
280. See supra Part II.B.1.
281. See supra notes 273-76 and accompanying text (discussing problems of
incentives for attorneys to disclose under the Hobbs proposal).
282. Johnson, supra note 96, at 98.
283. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
284. See Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban, Legal Ethics 230 (2d ed., 1995)
("[T]he attorney-client privilege is riddled with exceptions that are generally not
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality.").
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the client. Thus, even absent the other problems, Johnson's
proposed rule would be ineffective in informing history in cases where
the client is deceased. Since the privilege would still apply after the
client's death and the client obviously could not consent after death,
this rule would not allow historical disclosure after the death of the
client.
The rules that have been proposed to address the conflict between
the duty of confidentiality and the benefits to history are flawed
because they do not provide sufficient protection for client
confidences. In an attempt to address the shortcomings of these prior
proposed rules, the next section proposes a new amendment to Model
Rule 1.6 that more fully addresses the problems and issues pertaining
to historical disclosure of client information.
C. A Proposed Amendment to Model Rule 1.6 to Allow Attorneys to
Make Historical Disclosure
1. The Text of the Proposed Amendment
Disclosure of historically relevant client information would provide
an enormous benefit to society and would fill gaps in the historical
record.' Both practicing attorneys and legal commentators have
already recognized this potential benefit. '  Additionally, both
intuitive and empirically based reasons lead to the suspicion that
historical disclosure would not have a significant negative effect on
clients' frankness with their attorneys.' In light of these
considerations, such an exception should be adopted. The following
proposed amendment would authorize historical disclosure in the
proper circumstances. The amendment should be added to Model
Rule 1.6 immediately following paragraph (b):1
285. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (holding that the
attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client).
286. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the possible benefits of historical disclosure).
287. See supra notes 123-39 and accompanying text (practicing attorneys); notes
266-85 and accompanying text (legal commentators).
288. See supra Part II.B.2.
289. The amendment should be added immediately following the current language.
The text of the current rule is as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that
are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except
as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the la%%yer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm;
or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to
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(c) A lawyer may make his or her files and papers pertaining to the
lawyer's representation of a deceased client available to historical
repositories, including any parts of files that may reveal information
covered by paragraph (a), provided that:
(1) the sole purpose of the disclosure is to inform history;
(2) the lawyer receives no financial benefit from the release of
the files; and
(3) after a review of the files, the attorney is reasonably
convinced that the potential benefit to historical knowledge that
could be gained from the information in the files outweighs any
potential harm to the deceased client's reputation, family or
property.
If the attorney is deceased, the representative of his or her estate
may make any disclosures that the attorney may have been able to
make under this rule.
This proposed amendment290 addresses both the potential negative
effects on client candor and the potential benefit to history stemming
from the disclosure.
First, an attorney could not make any disclosures until the client
whose confidences are being disclosed is deceased. Until that time,
unless the information fits into one of the other exceptions to Model
Rule 1.6,291 the client must give his informed consent before the
lawyer can release any confidential information. This includes
organizational or corporate clients, who, in this context, would be
considered deceased when they are dissolved or cease to exist.2 9g This
requirement may lead to more donations of files related to individuals
than corporate entities because many corporations never dissolve.
While that result may be unfortunate, the requirement is necessary. If
corporate clients expected that their communications might be
disclosed before the dissolution of the corporation, they might censor
what they tell their attorneys for both potential liability and
reputational reasons. The proposed amendment requires that the
attorney wait until after the death or dissolution of the client because
as long as the client is alive, the decision to disclose should be made by
the client. Crafting the rule this way makes the exception less likely to
a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct
in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
Model Rules, supra note 7, R. 1.6.
290. While this proposal is for an amendment to the Model Rules, jurisdictions that
retain the Model Code should also adopt this amendment. The amendment would be
added as paragraph (E) of DR 4-101 in the Model Code.
291. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (listing exceptions to Model
Rule 1.6).
292. Cf. Hobbs, supra note 96, at 202 (advocating a rule that would allow historical
disclosure twenty-five years after "the dissolution of an entity client").
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affect client candor and is a responsible compromise with the
demands of history.
Second, the proposed amendment limits the purpose of disclosure
to informing history. Lawyers should not be able make their papers
available for other reasons. If information in the files does not have
historical value, the duty of confidentiality would require that the
information be kept secret. This provision in the rule protects against
lawyers releasing their files for nonaltruistic reasons, such as
vindictiveness. If the files do not have historical value, a vindictive
lawyer cannot disclose the information. If the information has
historical value, there is some danger that unscrupulous attorneys
might circumvent this requirement and claim that their motives were
pure. The next section of the amendment, however, prohibits lawyers
from benefiting financially from the disclosure.3' Thus, even if the
attorney's motive is unsavory, he cannot obtain material benefit from
releasing the information.
Not allowing attorneys to benefit financially from the disclosure
also protects clients and the reputation of the bar. Because lawyers
profiting from the disclosure of deceased clients' confidential
information would not project a respectable image of attorneys in
general,2 ' this provision ensures that disclosures under the historical
exception will not reflect poorly on the practice of law. Yet, this rule
would not prohibit attorneys from writing about information in files
that they donated to historical repositories. Because the donating
attorneys may not benefit financially, they likely would not be able to
write a book about the information contained in the files. They could,
however, write a law review article using the information, provided
they received no compensation for it.295 Additionally, they could give
interviews to news organizations to provide the historical context for
the information in the file, provided they were not paid for the
interview and did not reveal confidential information not contained in
the files.
The proposed amendment further protects clients by requiring an
attorney contemplating disclosure to review the files in question and
determine that the potential benefit outweighs the potential harm.
This provision protects the client in several ways.
293. Section (c)(2) of the amendment requires that the attorney who donates his
files "receive[] no financial benefit from the release of the files."
294. The bar is already subject to scorn and ridicule by many laypeople. As any
law student or lawyer knows all too well, there are numerous unflattering, but often
amusing, jokes about the profession. See, e-g., The New Yorker Book of Lawyer
Cartoons (1993); (A) LAW(t of) FUN, at http'J/www.duhaime.orgfun.htm (last
visited Mar. 2,2001).
295. For example, under this rule, the attorney from the Leo Frank example,
William Smith, see supra notes 153-63 and accompanying text, could write a law
review article about the moral dilemmas faced by attorneys in situations in which they
know their client is guilty of a crime for which someone else was convicted.
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If the representation concluded years before the lawyer is
considering donating the files to an historical repository, the attorney
most likely will not remember everything in those files. Requiring the
lawyer to review the files before disclosure ensures that she will be
familiar with their contents. While performing the review, the
attorney may discover information she had forgotten that could be
damaging to the deceased client; such information, therefore, should
cause the attorney to reconsider her decision to donate the files.
The file review also gives the attorney the opportunity to redact
embarrassing information. Nothing in this amendment would force
disclosing attorneys to donate entire files. If during the file review the
lawyer discovered damaging information, she could withhold that part
of the file when making the donation. Historians will likely not favor
the idea of attorneys redacting information before donating files.
They may argue that lawyers are not historians and thus do not fully
understand what information is important to historians. Yet, if the
attorney is not able to redact embarrassing information, she may not
be able to donate any of the file.296 Allowing the attorney to redact
some information enables the attorney to release as much information
as possible without causing harm to the client.
Finally, this provision requires attorneys to balance the benefit of
the disclosure with the harm that could be caused to the deceased
client and his or her family.297 If the information has little historical
value or the potential harm from the disclosure is substantial,
disclosure would be inappropriate. This provision will make the
decision whether or not to disclose in most cases fairly simple. The
majority of cases are of little historical significance and disclosure of
client confidences involved in such cases will not provide much, if any,
benefit to history.
In high profile cases, however, the balancing calculus will be more
challenging and will depend on the specific facts involved. The
attorney in those situations must remember that the scales are
weighted toward nondisclosure. If the lawyer is not reasonably
convinced that the benefit outweighs the harm, he should not donate
his files. This decision should not be made in a vacuum and the
attorney should take into account objective factors. Factors to
consider when assessing the historical value of the information include
296. When the attorney is considering whether to redact information from files, she
should consider the same objective factors that are to be considered in determining
whether to donate the files. See infra notes 298-303 and accompanying text.
297. Some historians may argue that an attorney is not equipped to judge the
historical benefit of the information. In some cases, such as the information possessed
by the hypothetical attorney in the Introduction, see supra notes 1-5 and
accompanying text, the historical benefit will be obvious. In many cases, however, the
value of the information may be less obvious. While there may be some merit to this
objection, the attorney in possession of the files is, ethically, the only one who can do
this balancing. Review by an historian would violate the duty of confidentiality.
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the extent to which the information is already widely known or
suspected,298 whether significant public interest in the matter
continues to exist and the amount of time that has elapsed since the
event in question. If the information is already widely known, the
damage done to the deceased client's reputation by disclosing
embarrassing information is not substantial. As more time passes, the
potential harm to the client is diminished, especially if public interest
in the event is still high. When determining the potential harms of
disclosure, the attorney should consider whether the information
could expose the client's active estate to potential civil liability,29
whether the information would stain the reputation of the deceased
client,300 or whether the information would harm the client's living
relatives. If the information could expose the client's estate to
liability, disclosure would not be appropriate. 0' Because some clients
may be concerned about their reputation after their death, 2
consideration of the effect the disclosure might have on that
reputation is necessary. Finally, consideration of family members who
survive the client may affect candor if the client is not assured that
those family members will be protected.' 3 Therefore, the attorney
should consider what effect the disclosure might have on living
relatives for whom the client may have had concern.
The last part of the proposed amendment addresses the donation of
an attorney's papers after the death of the attorney. The Model Rules
govern only attorney conduct and impose no obligations on
laypeople. °4 Therefore, if a layperson has possession of an attorney's
files after the attorney's death, that person has no obligation to follow
the dictates of Model Rule 1.6. She could thus choose to donate all of
the deceased attorney's files, including papers that contain
298. Cf. Johnson, supra note 96, at 98 (proposing a disclosure rule in which
attorneys considering making disclosures should consider, inter alia, how widely
known the information already is).
299. See infra note 307.
300. Cf Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976). In
Cohen, a Pennsylvania appellate court held that after the death of the client, the
necessity of the information should be balanced with the harm done to the former
client when deciding if the attorney-client privilege should apply. Id. at 693. The
court found that an attorney could testify that his deceased client admitted to
committing perjury and striking a pedestrian with his car. Id. at 691. The court
inexplicably stated that the disclosure did not "contain scandalous and impertinent
matter which would serve to blacken the memory" of the deceased client. Id. at 693.
301. In such a situation, the attorney may remedy the problem by waiting until the
close of the client's estate before making the disclosure.
302. See supra note 102.
303. See supra note 103 (discussing evidence that clients care about family
members who survive their death).
304. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Scope ("The Rules are designed to provide
guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through
disciplinary agencies."); see also Miss. St. Bar, Op. 114 (1986) (stating that laypeople
are not obligated to follow attorney ethics rules).
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embarrassing client confidences, without regard to the duty of
confidentiality.3 5 While the Model Code encourages lawyers to
"provide for the protection of the confidences and secrets of his client
following the termination of the practice of the lawyer, whether
termination is due to death, disability, or retirement,' 30 6 this
encouragement is unenforceable, especially after the death of the
attorney.30 7 If the attorney leaves his papers to another lawyer or a
lawyer is the executor of the attorney's estate, that attorney is bound
by the Model Rules.30 ' Because of this, the proposed amendment to
Model Rule 1.6 gives an attorney in possession of a deceased lawyer's
papers guidance on whether and how he can donate those files to
historical repositories.
2. Application of the Proposed Amendment to Model Rule 1.6
This Note began with a hypothetical story about disclosures by Lee
Harvey Oswald to his attorney in the days before his death.3" It
would be appropriate now to address how the proposed amendment
to Model Rule 1.6 would operate in such a situation.
If the hypothetical attorney wished to disclose the information he
received from Oswald, he would first have to ensure that Oswald had
in fact died. For obvious reasons, in this situation, the inquiry would
be easy to complete.
The next step would be for the lawyer to review the files that he is
considering disclosing. After this review, he would have to balance
the potential benefit of the information to historical knowledge
against its potential harm to Oswald's reputation, property, or living
family. Information revealing who assassinated President Kennedy
would have obvious significant historical importance and thus would
be eagerly sought by many historians. The release of such
information would pose little harm to Oswald's reputation or
property. Indeed, since he is currently regarded by most people as
Kennedy's killer, information pointing to another shooter would
deflect reputational harm away from Oswald and toward someone
else. Oswald's initial concern in the hypothetical about protecting his
305. This fact could also be used to justify an exception for historical disclosure.
Clients still disclose information to their attorneys even though the confidences may
be revealed at the attorney's death if their papers are left to nonlawyers.
306. Model Code, supra note 39, EC 4-6.
307. Once an attorney is dead, she is obviously beyond the reach of the disciplinary
process. She is not, however, beyond the reach of the civil system while her estate is
still active. If an attorney can be sued by a client for breaching the duty of
confidentiality, see supra note 241, then her estate may be liable for the same lapse.
Thus, it would behoove laypeople who are the executors of deceased lawyers' estates
to be conscious of the duty of confidentiality.
308. See Miss. St. Bar, Op. 114 (1986).
309. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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family would likely not be a concern now that almost forty years have
passed since the Kennedy assassination.
If the attorney concluded that the balancing test favored disclosure,
which would likely be the case, he would have to ensure that his sole
purpose for making disclosure was to inform history. The files would
have to be donated because the attorney could not benefit financially
from their release. The attorney could simply donate the files to an
historical institution such as the Library of Congress or the John
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library and Museum. In this manner, historians
would gain valuable information about the Kennedy assassination in a
way that would likely have little effect on clients' willingness to be
frank with their attorneys.
The amendment to Model Rule 1.6 proposed in this Note equips
attorneys with the ability to donate files that contain valuable
information to historical repositories. The attorney who wishes to do
so must consider objective factors to determine whether the
information has true value. He must then balance that value with the
harm that the disclosure might cause, such as civil liability,
reputational harm and harm to the client's living family. If clients are
reasonably assured that these factors will be considered, this type of
disclosure should have minimal effect on client candor.
CONCLUSION
In 1988, the National Law Journal asked in an editorial, "[w]hat
kind of ethics code would seriously countenance that generations for
all time could not learn the secrets of crucial earlier events solely
because of' the duty of confidentiality??3 1 The editorial concluded
that adding an exception for historical disclosure "is an idea whose
time has come. 3  Unfortunately, except for a few proposals, 2 little
has been done to answer that call. It is still time for ethics code
drafters to recognize the benefits of an exception to Model Rule 1.6
for historical disclosure. This Note provides an amendment that
would promote these benefits while still protecting the client candor
that is necessary in an effective attorney-client relationship.
310. History vs. Ethics, supra note 96.
311. Id
312. See supra Part III.B.
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